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It is well recognised that the capital requirements of
China's modernization programs are substantial. Funds
provided by international commercial banks in financing
projects in China are perhaps the most important
sources of capital.
This study aims at exploring the major issues facing
the international banks in their provision of
financings in China.
Issue One The Meaning of Project Financing in China
outlines the form and structure of the latest project
financing scheme used in China, with particular
emphasis on the security structure.
Issue Two Guarantee explains the importance of a
guarantee in financing, and Chinese policies on the
provision of such guarantees.
Issue Three What is a Sovereign Credit?" tries to
identify the different risk levels of lending to China
against the general idea that all loans are the
responsibility of the State.
Issue- Four Project Feasibility highlights the.
importance of project feasibility studies conducted by
banks, with examples of two projects where severe
problems developed because of incomplete feasibility
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studies.
Issue Five Project Operation discusses the potential
operational problems facing the projects and ways to
tackle them.
Issue Six Taxation describes the withholding tax
issue and the tax spacing scheme relating to
financings.
Issue Seven Documentation illustrates the various
issues of disagreement between the borrowers and the
lenders over the loan documentation.
Case studies are extensively used throughout the study
to illustrate the practical approaches being conducted
by the international banks in dealing with the issues.
In summary, international lenders should look carefully
into the feasibility of a project, and place special
emphasis on the ability of the project to generate
foreign exchange earnings. The strength and commitment
of the sponsors of the project are also extremely,
important. Furthermore, it must be ensured that all
aspects of a project including the financing
arrangements, comply with State policies and that all
necessary approvals have been obtained.
To facilitate the arrangement of financings, China
should also make its policies more specific and clear
on the various aspects of the financings, such as
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guarantees. Information about such policies and about
the borrower/sponsor/project should be disclosed as
much as possible. More importantly, laws and
regulations defining the rights and obligations of the
parties must be made available. For example, the
exercise of security rights by the lenders.
Improvements in these areas will provide a better
environment for the international banks in lending to
projects in China, this speed up the economic
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It has been well recognised that China's foreign
exchange needs are enormous. One source suggests that
in the next 15 years, China will need to raise at least
US$200 billion in order to accomplish the- economic
goals it has set for the year 2000. It is estimated
that even for the conservative Seventh Five-Year Plan
(1986-1990), about US$50 billion will be needed for the
development of coal mines, offshore and onshore
oilfields, the improvement of railroads, ports, air
transportation, power and telecommunications, and the
modernisation of existing factories. According to the
latest statistics, China's foreign exchange reserves
stood at Approximately US$13 billion as of 1987.
Even if these projections are overstated, there is
little doubt that the capital requirements of China's
modernisation programs are substantial. The issue,
then, is whether the country can attract sufficient
funds to meet its anticipated development needs.
I think the answer is yes, and for the following two
reasons.
First, the worst sovereign risks for commercial banks
2
exist principally in Latin America and Eastern Europe,
and with the exception of a few countries, Asian
sovereign borrowers enjoy good credit ratings. The
external debt of China is very low compared to most
other developing countries. In general, international
banks are willing to lend to China.
Second, major problems involving loans for projects in
China have been relatively few. Notwithstanding
difficulties with a few projects, the recent record of
bank lending to China projects has been satisfactory.
While marginally economic projects will find it
difficult to attract bank funding without some form of
sponsor or government support, worthwhile projects
should be able to attract finance.
It is estimated that since China embarked on the
modernisation programs, funds provided by international
commercial banks have amounted to US$2 billion.
Commercial financings will undoubtedly continue to be
the most important source of capital for the economic
development of China in the years to.come.
The objective of this study is to analyse some of the
problems encountered by international commercial banks
in financing projects in China. We will look at how
and to what extent the following issues will influence
a commercial bank's decision to lend to projects in
China:
1. the acceptability of the political environment;
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2. the availability of foreign exchange for debt
repayment
3. the economic viability of the project
4. the creditworthiness of the the project sponsors,
and especially the sources of government support
5. status of the project in the national economy and
the approval system
6. the seniority and security of the loan, and
government approval or recognition of such
security
7. the legal aspect of commercial financing, ie,
internationally acceptable legal documentation and
exercise of security rights
8. taxation issues, especially the imposition of
withholding tax for foreign borrowings
9. quality control and progress monitoring for
projects
10. the level of compensation relative to the
perceived risk.
More importantly, I will discuss how these problems are
presently dealt with by the banks and to what extent
those solutions are effective. Lastly, recommendations
will be given for the various issues, based on the
writer's own experience in the areas concerned.
The study has a strong practical bias. Materials will
be drawn from different kinds of project financings
completed during the past two to three years to
illustrate the problems and the solutions. A list of
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these examples includes:
1. a US$475 million 12-year partial recourse project
financing for the development of the An Tai Bo
Coal Mine in Shanxi Province signed in December
1986;
2. a HK$4.2 billion 12-year project financing for the
construction of the coal fired power plant in
Shajiao undertaken by Hopewell Group in Hong Kong
in April 1986;
3. a US$175 million 10-year financing for the
construction of the Shanghai Exhibition Centre
undertaken by the Portman Group in U.S. in
Shanghai in late 1985;
4. a US$90 million 7-year loan for part of the
construction of a power plant in Shanghai
undertaken by Huaneng International Power
Development Corporation in Novembor 1987;
5. a US$255 million loan for the financing of the
construction of the power plant in Nantong and
Shijarchong undertaken by Huaneng International
Power Development Corporation.
6. a US$45 million loan for the construction of the
Shangri-la Hotel in Beijing.
Furthermore, two problem projects will be discussed:
1. a US$96 million loan signed in 1984 for the
development of the Nanhai Oil Centre Project in
Guangzhou in which the project could not be
completed for various reasons
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2. a US$64 million loan signed in 1984 for the
development of a pier and related apartment
project in Zhuhai. It was discovered only after
the construction had been completed that the





The objectives of the research, as outlined in Chapter
I, are:
1. to identify the problems faced by international
banks in financing projects in China;
2. to examine the ways and means adopted by the banks
in dealing with the problems;
3. to explore alternative solutions and
recommendations for both the banks and the PRC
government in order to facilitate the future
development of financing activities in China.
The study will be based on data and information
collected-over the past 24 months by the writer. These
include published and unpublished materials on
financing schemes actually used for projects in China.
Case studies will be extensively used throughout the
research to reflect the practical aspect of the
subject.
The following research approach will be used :
1. As a first step, the problems for each specific
issue will be spelled out. For example, what are
the problems faced by the banks with respect to
the foreign exchange issue what is the impact on
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financing terms and conditions as a result of the
interest withholding tax requirement?
2. Then I will examine the extent to which these
problems affect financing decisions.
3. Relevant case studies will be used to reflect the
problems mentioned in the last two sections.
4. Lessons will be drawn from the practical approach
adopted by the banks in dealing with the problems.
5. As a further step, I will try to explore
alternative solutions for certain specific
problems.
6. Lastly, recommendations will be made to the banks
and the PRC government on areas for improvements
in their practices. The writer will endeavour to
analyse the subject not only from an international
banker's point of view, but also look at it from
the angle of Mainland China. This is made
possible by discussions with major financing
institutions like the Bank of China and the China
International Trust and Investment Corporation,
which are involved one way or another in all major




THE MEANING OF PROJECT FINANCING IN CHINA
Project financing is the term commonly applied to a
form of limited recourse financing for a new, capital
intensive, single purpose entity from which expected
cashflow is considered the primary source of repayment,
even though the loan may be supported by various
technical and/or financial commitments from the
sponsors, output purchasers, or others, and most often
secured by a charge on the project assets.
There are three generic types of project financing,
which relate to the amount of support that the
sponsor(s) will give to the lender(s):
1. Full recourse
2. Partial recourse
a. Partial recourse at all times
b. Full recourse until certain conditions are met
at which it converts to non-recourse
3. Non-recourse
Occasionally one defines project finance as confined
solely to non-recourse lending (type 3), where the
project cashflow and any residual asset values are the
only sources of repayment. The non-recourse form of
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financing, though applicable in a capitalist economy,
cannot be applied to the projects in China. This is
due to the following two reasons:
1. China is a centrally planned economy. All land and
properties belong to the State and cannot be
transferred or assigned without the approval of
the authorities. Because the security of a
project's assets is essentially a bundle of
rights, and there is legal uncertainty as to how
the Chinese government will permit an assignment
of those rights in case the lenders need to
enforce their security, the lenders cannot count
on or put a realisable value on the project
assets. As a result some form of guarantees or
undertaking by the sponsors of the project is
required.
2. Apart from the legal considerations, the lenders
often wish to structure the financing with
recourse to the sponsor(s), or any other parties
in the project in order to ensure the commitment
and support of the sovereign China, which is
particularly important in terms of foreign
exchange availability and infrastructure
facilities back-up.
I shall now discuss a unique project financing
completed at the end of 1986 in China which
illustrates, among other interesting features, how the
security package was structured to the satisfaction of
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both the lenders and the sponsors.
The US$475 million 10-year financing for the
development of the An Tai Bao Coal Mine in Shanxi
Province, better known as the Pingshuo Coal Mine, was
the latest and the most sophiscated project finance
arranged so far in China. This landmark deal not only
signified the successful venture of Dr. Armand Hammer
(Chairman of Occidental Inc.) in China, but it also
showed how the international banks strove their best to
apply the traditional project finance concepts in a
centrally planned economy.
The financing took about four years to arrange and drew
some of the best brains in project finance from the
entire world. The five arranging banks were the Bank
of America, the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Royal
Bank of Canada, Credit Lyonnais and the Bank of China,
with participation of forty other international banks.
It also won an award as one of the Deals of the year-
1986 by the publication Trade Financing, Euromoney.
The purpose of the loan was to finance the construction
of the Pingshuo Coal Mine which was a joint venture
between Occidental and the Chinese government through
the Bank of China Trust and Consultancy Corporation.
It was essentially structured as a partial-recourse
project financing.
The loan was divided into four tranches (A, B, C and D)
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of US$230 million, US$70 million, US$100 million and
US$75 million respectively, each representing a
different aspect of financing requirements as well as
credit risks structure.
Tranch A was a direct loan provided by the lending
syndicate, and Tranch B was a guarantee facility
provided by the lending syndicate to the Canadian
Export Credit Agency for the export credits provided by
the latter'in relation to the equipment purchases from
Canada.
Both Tranches A B are unconditionally guaranteed by
the sponsors before the construction of the mine is
completed. Once the mine completion test is fulfilled,
the sponsor guarantee will lapse and the primary source
of repayment of the loan principal and interest comes
from the cash generated from operations.
How can toe banks ensure that there is sufficient cash
generated from the sales of coal produced from the
mine? Similar to other project financings, there is an
offtake undertaking by a buyer. In this case, China
National Coal Import Export Corporation (CNCIEC)
under the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
Trade (MOFERT) undertakes to take up all the coal
output from the mine, based on the market price.
However, CNCIEC has no obligation to provide any other
forms of support if there is not enough coal produced
resulting in a deficiency in income. In view of the
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status of CNCIEC, the lending syndicate in fact relies
on the Chinese government as the ultimate obligor for
this offtake undertaking.
In addition to the production risk, the lenders also
have to consider the risk of coal price fluctuations
which will affect the project incomes. This leads to
our focus on Tranches C and D. Tranch C is a direct
loan to the project. However, unlike tranches A B, it
will remain sponsor guaranteed even after mine
completion unless the coal price reaches US$39 a ton,
then 50% of this tranche will be converted into a
stand-alone basis, and only if the coal price reaches
US$42 then the whole tranche will not be sponsors
guaranteed. The rationale behind this arrangement is
that the project will generate ample revenues under the
higher coal price levels which makes a guarantee
relatively less important.
Tranche D offers an emergency stand-by facility to
cover any temporary shortfall in revenues. In view of
its nature, it will always be sponsors guaranteed
throughout the loan tenor.
If the lenders need to enforce their security rights
due to such reasons as the project cannot continue or
non-repayment of debt, it is always subject to the
approval of the MOFERT. The chance of obtaining such
approval is unknown since there is no precedent in the
past and there is no legislation governing MOFERT's
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decision.
In view of such uncertainty, the lenders require an
additional security from the sponsors, ie, if MOFERT
does not approve the exercise of security right, the
sponsors undertake to repay the outstanding loan amount
based on a predetermined formula. The multi-level risk
bearing and security structure makes the Pingshuo Coal
Mine financing one of the most sophisticated project
financings' even by international standards, and
certainly poses itself as a precedent for future
project financings in China. It is a successful
project financing by all means, particularly in the
provision of a security structure which offers an
acceptable solution to the lenders and the sponsors.
Until a comprehensive set of legislation governing
commercial activities in China is completed, we can see
that the area of security rights remains a problem for
the international banks in providing financings to
China, and perhaps the structure of Pingshuo Coal Mine
financing represents the best solution available.
However one should not expect simply that the Pingshuo
structure will become the blueprint for future project
financing in China. Pingshuo is such a visible and
important state project that it draws the extensive
support and commitment by the Chinese government, which
most often is not available to other industrial or
commercial projects in other provinces or cities, and
14
some other form of project financing is therefore






The issue of guarantee is perhaps the most widely
discussed topic among the international banks in
financing projects in China. This is partly due to its
importance in a financing package, and partly due to
the uncertainties involved.
The importance of guarantees is because of the
following:
1. As described in the previous chapter, the
uncertainties involved in enforcing the security
rights by the lenders makes it necessary to obtain
a guarantee.
2. A sound guarantee enhances the overall
creditability of the project, particularly in a
situation where the borrower is a new joint
venture with no operation track record.*
3. The Chinese government's policy on foreign
exchange allocation and availability may change,
and this may have an impact on the financing
involved. A guarantee serves to ensure that the
loan repayment can be met.
Important as such, it is interesting to know that the
issue of guarantee causes a lot of confusion among the
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foreign banks. This is because the government's policy
on the issuance of guarantees has been constantly
changing without clear notification and guidelines
given to the foreign bank! Most often the policies are
outlined only in internal documents circulated within
the government circle. These are not available to
outsiders, including foreign banks.
Another problem facing a foreign bank is that it is
difficult 'to ascertain whether there is any limit to
the guarantees issued by the authorised institutions.
Many of these institutions do not provide any financial
information about themselves.
Therefore we see that guarantees issued by the Bank of
China or China International Trust and Investment
Corporation ("CITIC") are most welcomed by the foreign
banks because of their clearly stated authority to deal
with foreign currencies transactions and their proven
financial,stength.
There were examples in the past where some Chinese
organisations which issued guarantees later-found out
that they were in fact not authorized to do so.
Although these guarantees have ultimately been
honoured, it nevertheless caused substantial
embarassment to both the Chinese government and the
foreign bankers, and created uncertainties among the
lenders.
Based on information available, the current policy on
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the issuance of guarantee is as follows:
There is an official list of Chinese organisations that
have authority to provide guarantees for foreign
currency loans. These include the Bank of China and
its subsidiaries, CITIC, other financial institutions
under the central and/or provincial governments, and
branches of foreign banks in China, and a few others.
(Appendix 1)
If any other entities wish to become a guarantor, they
must then apply and obtain special approval from the
State Administration of Exchange Controls (SAEC). In
fact SAEC approval must be obtained before a project
can borrow funds from foreign banks.
The lastest policy on the issuance of guarantees was
announced in February 1987 which stipulated that
financial institutions can issue guarantees up to 20
times their paid-up capital, and non-financial
institutions are allowed to guarantee an amount
equivalent to their foreign exchange reserves and
incomes.
As a rule of thumb for foreign banks, the approval of
SAEC must be obtained as evidence of authority to
guarantee and to borrow. The form of guarantees used
can be illustrated by the following two project
financings completed in China.
The first example is the HK$4 billion financing
completed in mid-1986 for the construction of-the coal-
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fired power plant in Shenzhen which is a joint venture
between the Shenzhen Municipal Government and the
Hopewell Group in Hong Kong.
Under the financing scheme, the Chinese party
undertakes to supply the coal required by the project,
to purchase the electricity output at a predetermined
price, and to provide subordinated loans to the project
when expenses exceed revenues. Such obligations
undertaken by the Chinese party are guaranteed by the
Guangdong Internatonal Trust and Investment Corporation
(GITIC), one of the authorized guarantors.
Prior to completion of construction, the lenders are
relying on the sponsors to complete the project with.
the support of a performance bond issued by a third-
party international bank. After the construction is
completed and operation commences, the lenders will
rely on the project cashflow as a first way out, and
the financial support by the Chinese party guaranteed
by GITIC as an alternative source of repayment.
In comparison with Pingshuo Coal Mine, this.. financing
arrangement offers a better security position to the
lenders since the Chinese party has to undertake to
provide funding support in case there is a cashf low
shortfall.
In certain projects where cashflow is not the primary
source of repayment, the lenders rely heavily on the
guarantee. This can be illustrated by the US$230
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million loan financing to Huaneng International Power
and Development Corporation (HIPDC) in mid 1986 for
the construction of coal-fired power plants in Nantong
and Shijiazhuang. HIPDC is a state-owned corporation
under the State Council and is commissioned to
construct coal-fired power plants as stated in the
Seventh Five Year Plan.
Since these projects aim at providing electricity for
domestic usage and no foreign currency income can be
generated, the source of repayment does not come from
the projects but rather from an allocation of state
funds. A guarantee by the Bank of China is provided
to the lenders. However only very limited information
about the project is available.
In this situation, the lenders are in fact considering
the financing as a sovereign borrowing rather than a
project financing.
For some projects, a guarantee does not necessaily come
from the Chinese side. Indeed it can be a guarantee
provided by the foreign sponsor of the project or a
joint or several guarantees by both the Chinese and the
foreign sponsors.
For example, in the US$175 million financing for the
construction of the Shanghai Exhibition Centre in
Shanghai, 70% of the loan is guaranteed by Bank of.
China Trust and Consultancy Corporation (BOCTCC),
with the remaining 30% guaranteed severally by the
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foreign sponsors- the Portman Group and the American
International Group of USA and Kajima of Japan.
In the case of the China Hotel in Guangzhou, the
financing is guaranteed entirely by the foreign
investors. However, this is not common because the
foreign investors normally are not willing to guarantee
a loan for a project in which the assets cannot be
assigned or tranferred.
We see that institutions like the Bank of China, which
have issued a relatively large number of guarantees in
the past, are becoming more and more reluctant to act
as guarantors except for the State projects. The
reasons are firstly to discourage an over-reliance on
the guarantee by the lenders and secondly, as there
are increasing investment activities, it is difficult
for a guarantor like the Bank of China to monitor the
successful operation of each project.
To deal with the issue of guarantee, the foreign banks
should keep in mind the following principles:
1. Always refer to the latest list of ..authorized
guarantors to ascertain the legitimacy of a
guarantee, otherwise one must obtain SAEC's
special approval.
2. Always analyse the capability and strength of the
guarantor in relation to the scale of the project.
Most often financial information is not available,.
and one must look into the status of the guarantor
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in the government hierachy to determine its
capacity.
3. Remember that a guarantee is only the last way
out for the lenders. One should not over-emphasis
the importance of a guarantee and overlook the
underlying feasibility of the project and its
cashflow position. Having a guarantee does not




WHAT IS A SOVEREIGN CREDIT?
The foreign banks are often faced with the question of
what constitutes a China sovereign risk in making z
credit decision.
Should a commercial joint-venture hotel project
guaranted by one of the authorized guarantors be
classified as a sovereign credit? Or is it correct to
consider that a factory operation in the special
economic zone has the same credit status as the
Pingshau Coal Mine project, although both of them are
joint ventures representing Chinese government
interests?
To identify what is a genuine Chinese sovereign credit
is important for the international banks both for
policy and for practical reasons. This is because the
identification gives guidelines and indications as to
the overall quality of the projects, the repayment
capabilities, and the appropriate pricing in relation
to the perceived risk level.
China operates substantially as a centrally planned
economy. Accordingly, all levels of government are
ultimately under the authority and responsibility of
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the central government (the State). Sovereign risk
therefore is the credit responsibility assumed by the
State for an obligation of one of the entities over










The highest organ of state administration and the
executive organ of state power is the State Council.
Ministries are industry instrumentalities of the State
and, as such, are executors of State policies. In
addition to the named Ministries, and at the same
level, there are a variety of commissions and other
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organizations, such as the People's Bank of China and
CITIC.
Provinces are geographic instrumentalities of the State
and, like the Ministries, are executors of State
policies. There are presently twenty-three provinces
(as well as five autonomous regions).
In terms of status in the government hierachy,
provinces are at the same level as Ministries. Three
cities, Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, are -at this
level as well.
All municipalities report to the relevant provincial
government, with the exception of the fourteen 'open'
cities, the four Special Economic Zones and the
municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin which,
as noted, report to a special department under the
State Council.
Open cities, in fact, are other municipalities. Their
special classification as open cities, like special
Economic Zones, are a result of government policy which
can be changed. Hence an open city may lose its status
as an open city, but it is nevertheless a city (ie,
municipality) a Special Economic Zone in losing its
status is nothing.
To what extent an entity can be regarded as sovereign
risk is of course subject to the assessment of the
individual banking institution. However it is a fact
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that the lower one goes down the authority and
responsibility pyramid, the higher the degree of risk-





As mentioned in the previous chapters, project
financings in China are seldom structured on a stand-
alone basis. Some form of guarantees is usually
included as part of the security structure. Relying on
a guarantee from a sovereign entity and the good credit
record of China, the lenders sometimes may lose sight
of the fact that the primary source of repayment for
the financing should come from the operational cashflow
and that a guarantee can only be regarded as an extra
benefit and a last way out.
Indeed the fundamental question bankers should ask is
whether the project is feasible or not, instead of who
will be the guarantor. However, there is no easy
answer to this question as China is a centrally planned
economy and, due to the shortage of market information,
it is often difficult to obtain the kind of data
required to make an indepth feasibility analysis.
Before making an independent assessment, a quick and
practical approach for the lenders is to check whether
the project under consideration has been 'approved' by,
the relevant authorities in China.
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Under the present system, all projects have to be
approved by the Local Planning Commission (LPC) or by
the State Planning Commission (SPC) if the value of
the project exceeds local approval authority. Both the
LPC and the SPC are offices directly under the State
Council. Only the State Council may approve projects
involving a total investment of Rmb 100 million or
more. The approval limits for certain provinces,
special Economic Zones and open cities are given in
Appendix 2.
To qualify for approval, a feasibility study has to be
prepared, normally by the Chinese entity involved as a
joint venture partner or sponsor. The feasibility
study covers all major aspects of the project and a
typical checklist is shown in Appendix 3.
To ascertain a project's approval status is important
for the following reasons:
1. Most important of all, it ensures that a
feasibility study has been made and that it is
acceptable on economic grounds.
2. It ensures that the project is in compliance with
the the government's policies with regard to
specific industries and/or geographical areas.
3. It confirms the status of the project- whether it
is a state project or commercial joint venture
project.
25
The next question asked by the bankers, then, is how
realistic the feasibility study is. Due to the limited
resources available, it is often difficult for the
lenders to conduct independent assessments of the
business projections prepared for these feasibility
reports.
The feasibility of a project is sometimes either
overstated or understated by the sponsors due to
various business and taxation reasons. The
abovementioned problem is particularly obvious among
the joint ventures in the Special Economic Zones where
a high degree of freedom is granted by the central
government. I will discuss two of these problem
projects in the following:
A joint venture was formed in 1984 in Zhuhai Special
Economic Zone for the development of the Zhuhai
Deepwater Port Project by a corporation under the
Zhuhai municipal government, a Hong Kong company and an
entity under the Guangdong provincial government. A
syndicated project loan of US$ 64 million was raised
through the Hong Kong party with an unconditional
guarantee by the Zhuhai party.
The construction of the project ran well and completion
was on schedule. However the problem is that since the
commencement of operation, incomes have been barely
enough to cover operating expenses not to mention
interest payments and repayment of loan principal.
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What's wrong with the project?
The project was originally designed to provide port and
residential facilities for expatriates working on oil
exploration projects in the South China Sea. It was
reported to be the only deepwater port around the area.
The sluggish business demand is attributed mainly to
the unsatisfactory offshore oil development and also
partly due to the insufficient transportation network
linking the port with other parts of the province. For
example, it takes about four hours to connect the port
with the nearest railroad.
Furthermore, while the port has a maximum loading
capacity of around 2 million tons per year, it will
need a loading of about 1.8 million tons per year in
order to break even, i.e. to meet all operating
expenses and financing payments.
In retrospect it seems that the inital feasiblity study
was overly optimistic without any in-depth
consideration about the demand situation, the
infrastructure support, the operating expenses, etc.
The fate of the project had not been decided at the
time this paper is written, but one thing for certain
is that some form of project and loan restructing is
required. The lenders can now only rely on the good
faith of the sponsors and the guarantor to honour their
financial obligations.
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Another problem project relates to the construction of
the Nanhai Oil Center Project in Guangzhou. The joint
venture was also established in 1984 between a Chinese
entity of Guangdong province and a Hong Kong investor.
The project calls for the construction of a hotel,
apartment and commercial complex in the heart of
Guangzhou city costing US$96 million. Again it was to
cater for the expatriates working on oil projects in
the South China Sea.
However the construction came to a halt in mid-1986
essentially for two reasons:
1. There was a substantial cost over-run and
construction delay, US$ 20 million was spent with
only the basement level of one-third of the
construction site completed. The reason was due
to some unforeseen engineering difficulties.
2. At the same time, the hotel market in Guangzhou
had 'been deteriorating due to over-supply. The
average occupancy was only about 50%, which is
unlikely to generate sufficient incomes to cover
operating and financing expenses.
The loan amount was ultimately repaid in full by the
guarantor (the Chinese joint venture partner) in early
1987. Although the lenders were financially unharmed,
it did leave substantial embarrassment for both the
lender and the Chinese.
Some conclusions can be drawn from the above two cases:
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Even if the project itself is approved, the
underlying feasibility may not be realistic and
the lenders should exercise due diligence in
independently assessing the creditability of the
project.
Business situations are unpredictable, even in a
centrally planned economy like China. For
example, nobody can predict what is the outcome of
the oil exploration programmes in the South China
Sea. As a result, lenders should never allow
basic credit judgement to be substituted by the
provision of guarantees by the sponsors or other





The successful completion and operation of a project is
of primary concern for the lenders since this is where
the source of loan repayment comes from.
A handful of problems can happen to a project in China
such as the shortage of labour, lack of infrastrutural
facilities support, supply of power and water, raw
materials supply, skills level of Chinese staff,
political uncertainties, cost overruns, operation
efficiency, and others.
It is impractical for the lenders, given their limited
resources, to closely monitor the progress of a
project, and most often it is left to the sponsors to
ensure that the above issues can be effectively dealt
with as they arise.
To make sure that a project can proceed smoothly, the
lenders should look into the following elements when
considering the extension of financings:
1. Who is the' project operator?
The project operator need not necessarily be the
sponsors, especially when the sponsors are not
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experienced in the industry and act purely as the
investors. This applies more often to the hotel
projects in China where the lenders will normally
insist that an international reputable hotel
operator be appointed to run the hotel as a
condition precedent for providing the loan.
Preferrably the hotel operator has previous
experience in China as well.
For industrial and energy projects, it is usually
the foreign partner who will provide the technical
know-how and actually be involved in the running
of the operations for a certain period of time,
say five to ten years after the project
completion. During this time, the foreign partner
will also responsible for training the local staff
to ensure a smooth transition after the inital
period.
In view of the fact that China is still a
developing country, an experienced operator is
invaluable for both the investors and the lenders
as he will contribute greatly in solving problems
and maintaining quality standards of operation.
Who is the sponsor from the Chinese side?2.
Although the Chinese sponsor most often will not
be involved-in the operation of the project, its
assistance is very important to the successful
running of the operation, especially in the areas
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of negotiation with relevant authories for the
provision of infrastructure facilities, such as
water and power, labour and raw materials.
The status of the Chinese sponsor is therefore an
important factor for the lenders in considering
the operating risks of the project. It is
practically true that the abovementioned problems
will either not happen or will be more easily
solved if the Chinese sponsors are at the senior
level of the government hierachy.
3. Independent engineer
For those large scale or technically complex
projects such as a nuclear power plant, an
independent engineer will be hired to advise the
lenders on a regular basis of the progress and
status of a project, and give early warning about
potential problems.
If the above three parties are satisfactorily arranged,
the chance of success of the project will be greatly
enhanced.
I will discuss two projects in China that have shown
operational problem in the past.
The first one was the HK$ 257 million joint-venture
Ramada Renaissance Hotel in Guilin which was opened in
May 1987. It was reported that even before the opening
of the hotel, there was about HK$ 10 million lost in
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building materials, fittings, food, television sets and
other items through alleged stealing.
At one time, the hotel was also cut for water supply,
telephones, telex and electricity when there was a
dispute with the local authorities about the fee
charged. The local authorities also demanded that the
hotel buy some twenty-year interest-free bonds before
power was returned to normal.
Whether the incident mentioned above is true or not is
being investigated by a senior offical from Beijing.
However this is certainly not the kind of event that
the lenders would like to see.
The other reported problem occurred to the Guangzhou
Superhighway being built by the Hopewell Group of Hong
Kong. The local authorities demanded that certain of
the construction contracts be awarded to a Chinese
local contractor who was unacceptable to the Hong Kong
investor. Again the issue was taken to Beijing and the
local authorities' demand was repelled by the Central
Government.
The above cases show the kind of problems that can
occur on projects in China. In both situations, the
problems start at the local level and the involvement
of senior officals from Beijing Central Government is
required to solve them.
As a further recommendation, a comprehensive insurance
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coverage is essential for any project operations in
China as an additional protection for both the
investors and the lenders.
The normal package required by the lenders is an all-
risks insurance coverage for the project. This will
generally cover most of the risks involved in the






Among the various taxation issues, the foreign lenders
are most concerned about the tax relating to the
interest income from making loans in China. The tax is
normally referred to as the interest withholding tax.
The standard withholding tax rate in China is 20% on
gross interest income paid by a borrower in China to
foreign banks. There is a concession for loans
extended for projects in the Special Economic Zones and
the fourteen open cities which reduces the rate to 10%.
The tax can be further reduced or wholly exempted if
the loan or the underlying equipment related to the
loan is provided at favourable terms.
First of all let us do some calculations to show the
extent of the impact of the withholding tax on both the
borrowers and the lenders.
Most of the financings in China are structured on a
floating rate based basing on the London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR) or Hong Kong Interbank Offered
Rate (HIBOR) plus a margin which reflects the risks
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level and the structure of the financing. The margin
in fact is the net income received by the banks since
LIBOR or HIBOR represents the lenders' cost of funds.
Consider the following example: if the six-month LIBOR
is 9% and the margin is 1%, the gross interest rate
would be 10%. If the withholding tax rate is 20%, the
tax payment is then 2% which equals to 200% of the
margin changed by the banks! Even at the concession
rate of 10%, it remains equal to 100% of the margin.
There are certain conditions under which the
withholding tax can be exempted in full. I pick up the
two relevant ones for discussion as follows:
1. Interest on loans provided by foreign banks to
Chinese State banks, trusts and investment
corporations.
2. Interest on loans is less than or equal to the
interbank offered rate, such as LIBOR.
In most of the state projects, such as power plants and
oilfield development, the interest withholding tax is
fully exempted through special approval. For other
projects like joint venture industrial or hotel
operations, the borrower has to bear the tax. However
on one occassion a project loan was structed in such a
way to tackle the issue of withholding tax payment.
In late 1985, a US$ 45 million loan was arranged for
the construction of the Shangri-La Hotel in Beijing
which is a joint-venture between a foreign investor and
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a Chinese corporation under MOHSLT.
It is similar to other financing transactions for this
type of hotel project execpt for one special feature,
i.e. the foreign banks, instead of landing directly to
the project, deposited the funds in the Bank of China
which will in turn lend the funds to the project. The
deposit agreement between the foreign banks and the
Bank of China and the borrower is tied up with the loan
agreement between the Bank of China and the borrower.
That means the lenders will still rely on the project
as the source of repayment without recourse to the Bank
of China, which acts only as an intermediary.
The benefits of this arrangment are that funds placed
by the foreign banks with the Bank of China are not
subject to the withholding tax, and the Bank of China
in lending to a local borrower is also not subject to
the withholding tax.
The arrangment was a controversial one and the outcome
was that the tax authority gave a special exemption for
this financing but not its blessings for this kind of
arrangment. It is understood that such a scheme will
not be accepted by the tax authority.
Closely related to the withholding tax issue is the tax
sparing scheme of financing projects in China.
Tax sparing can be a competitive tool used by the banks
to pass on some of the tax credits they gain under a
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double taxation agreement between China and the foreign
country to the borrower by quoting a lower interest
rate.
Take the example of Japan, which had signed a taxation
agreement with China. The result is that if China
exempts the Chinese borrower from paying the
withholding tax, the Japanses lenders can receive a tax
credit from the Japanese tax authority equal to the
amount of exemption. We show the following as an
example:
If LIBOR equals 9% and the margin is 1%, the gross
interest then is 10%, and the withholding tax (at 10%
rate) would be 1%. Therefore the Japanese banks can
get 1% tax credits in addition to the 1% margin, a
total of 2%. In order to quote competively, the
Japanese banks can lower its margin to 0.5% and still
receive a total revenue of 0.5% (margin) plus 0.95%
(tax credit).
Using this tax sparing scheme, the Chinese borrower is
benefited, and logically they will borrow from the
Japanese banks rather than from other international
banks which quote a higher interest rate without the
tax sparing benefits. This creates two concerns:
1. Non-Japanese banks are becoming uncompetitive in
financing projects in China in terms of interest
rate charges.
2. Over-reliance on funds provided by Japanese banks
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may be considered as risky for China from a
political and commerical point of view.
In the past nine months, there were at least three
major syndicated financings using the tax sparing
scheme: a US$150 million loan for the people's
Construction Bank of China, a US$ 90 million loan for
Huaneng International Power Development Corporation and
a US$ 180 million loan for the China Petrochemical
Corporation ("SINOPEC"). The margins were relatively
very low in comparision with other project financings,
and not surprisingly, almost all participating banks
for these financings are Japanese banks.
Tax sparing in fact is a subsidy granted by the lending
banks' country to the borrowers' country. It is
expected that this type of tax sparing loan will
continue to dominate the financing scene in China, with
more countries such as West Germany and Brussels





The preparation and negotiation of loan documentations
for project financings in China has always been a
lengthy process and often creates substantial conflicts
between the foreign lenders on the one hand, and the
borrower and guarantor on the other.
The writer recalls that in the earlier days, the
Chinese borrower or guarantors would argue heavily on
such issues as the choice of foreign law, place of
jurisdiction, Chinese versus English language, and
sovereign immunity.
It seems that the lenders have won an upper-hand on
these issues and at present the Chinese generally will
accept the lenders requirements in these areas, with
reference to the many precedent documents signed over
the past few years.
However, based on the writer's latest knowledge, there
are two fundamental issues which have not been
satisfactorily compromised, as shown in the latest loan
financing documents. Although they are essentially
standard clauses in typical Eurocurrency loan
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documents, the Chinese borrower reacts in a different
way:
1. Nagative pledge
The lenders often require an undertaking by the
borrower or the guarantor that they will not allow
any charge on their assets without the prior
approval of the lenders or giving the same
security right to the lenders.
Some Chinese entities, such as the Bank of China,
consider that this is not acceptable in view of
their extensive activities which may in some
aspects require some form of mortgage of their
assets.
2. Cross default
The intention of the clause is to enable the
lenders to call an event of default if the
borrower or the guarantor fails to perform their
obligation in some other loan agreements.
Again some Chinese entities do not accept this
based on the grounds that they have extensive
contractual obligations which makes this clause
impractical and unacceptable.
In fact, there was a loan scheduled for signing in
August 1987 between the Bank of China and the foreign
lenders, and due to the disagreement over the above two
clauses, the loan could not be concluded.
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In negotiating a loan document with a Chinese borrower,
it is the writer's experience that a flexible approach
should be adopted, such as giving in on some relatively
minor issues and insisting only on the fundamental
points.
This is perhaps due to the considerable difference
between the Western and Chinese concepts of contractual
obligations. The foreign lenders must bear this in mind





Ensuring foreign exchange revenues from a project is
always a major concern of banks. If no direct foreign
exchange is created by a project, the banks may require
additional security for debt repayment. Therefore,
most of the projects in China we have seen so far have
centered on the services sector, eg. hotels, which have
foreign patronage. Development of oilfields and coal
mines can be feasible if a sufficient portion of
production is exported to generate foreign exchange
income in sufficient volume for debt repayment and
profit repatriation.
Banks should review the feasibility studies that
provide detailed information to allow a comprehensive
evaluation of a project's economic viability, and to
assess the level of risk to the cashflow available for
repayment.
The financial strength of the project sponsors or other
supporting entities should be examined for
creditworthiness, and to ensure that each party can
perform its obligations. While information on the
foreign sponsor is readily available, it is often
difficult to have access to vital information on the
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relevant Chinese entities necessary for a credit
decision. In this regard, we could only hope that with
the continuous development of China, more and more
information about government policies and entities will
be made known to the banks.
In the past, most banks extended financing on the
assumption that all enterprises were state-owned, and
that, since all proper approval should have been
obtained before a foreign obligation was undertaken,
therefore it could be deemed that the State is
committed. However, the recent political and economic
reforms have taken this unilaterally assumed 'comfort'
away. Under the new system, government administration
and enterprises are segregated, and enterprises are
held accountable for their own economic efficiency.
Time and again, government spokesmen have indicated
that inefficient enterprises will be allowed to go
bankrupt.. These economic reforms, together with the
installation of laws and regulations defining the
rights and obligations of each party in a transaction
have changed the complexion of lending to China.
Lending to projects in China has entered a more mature
and sophisticated phase. Banks can no longer assume
that the obligations of state-owned enterprises are
the obligations of the State. Banks will need to
conduct conventional analyses of financial,
operational, marketing and management risks.
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Closely related to this analysis is the availability of
foreign exchange for an entity to honor its foreign
exchange obligations, including the extension of
foreign exchange guarantees. This must be carefully
checked by the banks with reference to the approval
list of SAEC's special approval. Banks should also
know whether the obligation undertaken by a Chinese
entity is out of proportion to its foreign exchange
reserves.
In addition to the above, commercial lenders would seek
a security over the assets of the projects. The
ability of enforcement of security rights is still an
area of uncertainty, and it is hoped that more clear
legal guidelines will be provided by the Chinese
government soon.
There are various risks in association with the
operation of the project. Again this should be
carefully- assessed and handled by drawing the support
of quality parties into the project. Promotion of the
project to a senior or State level is practically very
useful.
We can also see that the foreign banks would welcome
the more direct involvement of the Bank of China or
other State banks in extending financings in China,
either as the leadmanager or the agent, or both, to
ensure that the project is monitored by a recognised
and powerful State organisation. Lastly, lenders should
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make a careful assessment of the total transaction risk
relative to the loan pricing to be assured that there
is sufficient economic incentive for the loan. The
popularity of the tax sparing loan causes substantial
difficulties for non-Japanese banks in making loans to
China in a reasonably profitable manner.
Faced with all these problems, we see that some of the
international banks have been withdrawing from the
China market. At present it seems that the most active
players in the China market remain the Japanese banks.
On a long term perspective, such development may not be
good for China, as this will limit the sources of funds
for its extensive development plans. Therefore, the
Chinese government must provide a better structure and
















































對 外 擔 保 金 融 機 構 名 單
行 類
中 国 银 行 及 其 分 行 ，
汇 丰 银 行 上 海 分 行 ，
汇 丰 银 行 深 圳 分 行
汇 丰 银 行 厦 门 分 行
标 准 渣 打 （ 麦 加 利 ） 银 行 上 海 分 行 ,
标 准 渣 打 （ 麦 加 利 ） 银 行 厦 门 分 行 ，
标 准 逢 打 （ 麦 加 利 ） 银 行 深 别 分 行
标 准 渣 打 （ 麦 加 利 ） 银 行 珠 海 分 行
华 侨 银 行 上 海 分 行 ，
东 正 银 行 上 濂 分 行 ，
南 澤 商 业 银 行 深 圳 分 杆
# 洋 商 业 舫 舴 分 行 ,
祕 南 通 银 行
广 ^ 银 行 深 圳 分 行 ，
I
国 际 商 业 信 贷 ’ 银 行 （ 海 外 ） 有 眠 公 旬 深 圳 分 行
大 华 银 行 麋 门 银 行
东 方 汇 魏 狀 明 分 行 ，
集 友 银 行 廈 門 分 行
法 國 兴 業 銀 行 深 圳 分 行
美 国 建 东 银 行 羡 门 分 行
巴 黎 国 民 银 行 深 圳 分 行 ，
东 家 银 行 溧 塡 分 行 ，
北 海 遒 拓 痕 镶 行 深 圳 分 行 ，
三 和 镶 行 深 蠣 分 行 ，
中 國 工 离 银 行 广 东 省 分 行 ，
中 國 工 商 银 行 福 建 耆 分 行 ，
中 國 工 商 舫 上 舯 分 行 ，
丰 埋 工 餽 鵂 山 分 行 ,
中 國 工 商 銀 行 油 頭 分 行
中 國 工 馘 御 州 分 行 ，
中 國 工 商 银 行 广 州 分 行 ，
中 國 工 窗 轚 行 羡 门 市 分 行 ，
中 國 工 窝 镊 行 乘 讲 市 分 行
中 國 脔 镶 行 疎 海 市 分 行
中 国 工 紐 行 大 连 市 分 行
中 國 工 商 银 行 四 川 省 分 行 ，
中 國 工 南 银 行 天 章 有 分 行 ，
中 國 农 業 銀 行 佛 山 分 行 ，
中 國 农 業 銀 行 广 州 分 行 ，
中 國 投 资 银 行
交 通 銀 行
招 商 銀 行
中 信 实 業 銀 行
中 國 國 际 对 务 有 限 公 司
截 止 一 九 八 七 年 八 月 三 十 一 日 經 國 家 外 匯 管 理 批 准 下 列 金 融 機 構 輸 外 匯 擔 保 業 務
































































中 团 国 际 信 托 投 资 公
中 国 工 商 银 行 倌 托 投 资 公 用
上 海 市 投 资 愴 托 公 嘢
上 海 纽 妯 純 赇 公 巧
广 东 团 际 信 托 投 资 公 旬 ，
權 建 投 资 企 亚 公 蚵
屣 门 际 信 托 投 耷 公 ，
渐 北 省 评 信 祀 投 殊 公 角 ，
武 汉 埋 际 信 托 投 资 公 句 ，
夭 涑 帘 际 倌 托 役 奔 公 用 ，
江 考 . ( 錢 “ 司
辽 宁 省 际 信 托 投 资 公 旬 ，
中 银 行 信 托 咨 询 公 旬 ，
中 国 银 行 上 海 信 托 备 请 公 用 ，
中 国 银 行 天 津 际 信 饵 抚 资 公 句 .
中 国 银 行 珠 扣 信 托 咨 雀 么 句
中 国 银 ， 行 庆 信 托 咨 询 公 句
中 国 银 行 北 京 信 托 咨 也 公 笥
中 银 行 杭 州 嘥 托 咨 珣 公 旬
河 北 耆 国 际 信 托 投 资 公 玛 ，
中 开 发 信 托 投 资 总 公 句 ，
广 州 团 碎 信 托 投 资 公 句 ，
溧 圳 囯 际 倌 托 使 资 总 公 句 ，
I
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广 州 际 信 托 ; 资 公 和 ; 济 汰 未 开 发 区 分 公
司，
佛 山 市 信 抬 投 资 爲 公 旬 ，
江 苏 省 国 际 信 托 ; 安 公 笱 ，
此 玄 国 料 触 资 公 司
江 西 国 际 倌 托 抆 资 公 句 ，
沈 阳 随 紐 资 公 句 ，
重 庆 际 信 托 投 资 公 用 ，
四 川 长 江 因 碎 信 托 忮 资 公 用 ,
陕 西 省 金 酏 眹 合 投 赉 公 句 ，
安 敢 省 国 际 信 托 投 丧 公 用 ，
吉 林 省 国 际 信 托 梗 资 公 訇 ，
河 南 耆 国 际 信 托 投 资 公 切 ，
广 西 团 际 信 托 ： 资 公 和 ，
宁 爰 俨 斯 兰 譁 信 相 ; 赛 公 调 ，
油 头 碎 信 托 故 资 公 、
塌 甯 省 面 賻 倌 托 ; 齊 公 用 ，
大 连 障 倌 挎 捷 資 公 和 ，
南 京 市 鼸 戕 資 公
连 云 港 市 脒 值 托 歉 齊 公 葡 ，
宁 波 隊 信 托 抶 资 公 葡 ，
山 西 轻 济 开 史 投 黉 公 和 ，
中 团 新 故 术 射 投 賨 公 用 ，
光 犬 伞 蘸 必 用 ’ ，
中 面 工 寓 斂 行 夭 漳 市 信 托 资 公 ，
中 团 工 裔 狀 找 的 跗 资 公 可
中 对 外 窠 易 轘 賃 公
新 碎 信 托 投 齊 公 角 ，
中 因 电 子 租 赁 公 笱 ，
福 建 华 侨 投 资 公 葡 ，
广 东 择 拫 貨 公 和
溫 州 黯 诚 資 公 对 ，
北 京 旅 游 信 托 齊 公
黑 龙 江 团 际 倌 托 技 资 公 苟 ，
中 赁 有 觐 公 爾
珠 瑋 市 倌 托 挽 耷 公 角 ，
西 安 际 倌 托 拽 资 公 ，
丹 东 碎 倌 托 捷 黉 公 葡 ，





US$5 millionA. Provisions, Autonomous Regions, and
Open Cities
US$10 millionExcept - Beijing
US$10 millionFujian
US$10 millionGuangdong
RMB 30 millionB. Special Economic Zones
to 100 million- Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen,
depending on typeZhuhai
of industry)
C. Coastal Cities, Hainan Island
US$30 million- Shanghai, Tianjin
US$10 million- Dalian, Guangzhou




PART I GENERAL DATA
* Joint Venture ("JV") name, location, objective
* Description of partners (include sponsor in China
and name of persons with primary responsibility
for the project)
* Business scope, legal format (limited liability
company) and duration
* JV administrative structure (include name and
number of positions to be filled)
* Summary of total investment
---Proportion, value, and form of each partner's
contribution
---Loan details, if applicable
PART II MARKET ANALYSIS
* Current and future market for product
---Sales estimate (total and by price category)
---Projected foreign and domestic distribution
---Local industry conditions and prospects
* Past product imports and projected trends
* Role of the industry in national economy
* Anticapted competition (local foreign)
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PART III LOCATION AND SITE
* Land (site) use arrangement (include land-use fee
and local department in charge if land not part of
equity contribution)
* Complete layout of JV plant/buildings and capacity
* Infrastructure improvements required
PART IV PRODUCTION/OPERATION PLAN
* Quality of product/service (include international
technical standards if appropriate)
* Estimated annual output/turnover (both before
project reaches full capacity and each year
thereafter)
* Transport and local storage requirements
* Product testing and quality control
* Trial production procedures and equipment
* Products, by-products, and waste (include
estimated annual cost of waste disposal)
* Environmental protection plan (include projected
pollution problems and treatment)
* Details on separate work locations, if applicable
(input/output of each location, amount processed
annually, value added at each facility, labour
costs)
PART V MATERIAL INPUTS
* Approximate input requirements for all materials
* Present and potential sources of supply
54* Availability of utilities, especially power
* Transport routes planned
* Rough estimate of annual cost of local and
foreign inputs
PART VI PROJECT ENGINEERING
* Description of technology and equipment to be used
* Cost estimate (include, if applicable, technology
transfer fees, royalty rate, and terms of payment)
* Rough layout of proposed equipment and costs
* Rough layout of civil engineering works and costs
PART VII ORGANIZATION AND OVERHEAD COSTS
* Planned organization structure (production, sales,
administration, management)
* Estimated overhead (factory/operations,
administrative, financial)
PART VIII MANPOWER
* Estimated manpower requirements (local/foreign
staff by major category of skills)
* Units where employees will come from and positions
they will fill
* Estimated wage scales, including overhead
* Personnel training plan
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PART IX FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC EVALUATION
* Estimated total investment costs (include working
capital, fixed assets and amortization)
* Project financing
---Proposed capital structure
---Proportion and value of each partner's
contribution
---Terms of proposed financing, if applicable
* Production cost
---Initial establishment/installation cost
---Annual operation cost, analyzed by work location
if applicable
---Cost of technology, training, material inputs,
transport, utilities, overhead
* Levy of taxes, duties, insurance (include
expected rebates, reductions, and exemptions)
* Financial evaluation based on above-cost
estimates (factoring in inflation)
* Projected annual profits (RMB and foreign
currency)
* Profit distribution plan
* Cost analysis for products to be introduced later
on, if applicable
* Statement of plan for balancing foreign exchange
income and expenditure (must be separately
approved by MOFERT or local FERTC depending on
size and nature of project)
* Evaluation of project impact on the national
economy
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PART X JV IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
* Overall time schedule proposed
* Schedule for preliminary operations and estimated
cost
* Subcontractors and consultants involved (Chinese
and foreign)
PART XI ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTATION
Indicate documents to be prepared, by whom, and
specific responsibilities:




* Written guarantees granted to investers, if
applicable
* Written statements of opinion from relevant
government organizations
* Formulation of JV agreement and/or contract
* Formulation of the JV articles of incorporation
* Other relevant documents, understandings,
agreements
PART XII WORK PLAN PRECEDING ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JV
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